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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The most widely discussed explanations of etluiic conflict are, at best...
w rong. Ethnic conflict is not caused directly by inter-group differences,
ancient hatreds” and centuries-old feuds... Nor were etlmic passions, long
bottled up by repressive communist regimes, simply uncorked by the end
of the Cold War. (Lake and Rothcliild, 1996)
Reflecting on international affairs in the 20"' centur>' demands attention to the dangerous
waves of oppression which resulted in the persecution of many people on the basis of their
political identity. Whether we recall the Holocaust, the territorial disputes between
Palestinians and the state of Israel or more recently the mass displacements of the Bosnian
war, the extent to which identity has been used as a political tool could overwhelm anv
scholar or practitioner of international relations. For this reason it could be argued that the
concept of identity is nothing new to the discipline of International Relations (IR) as the well
as the practice of it (ir). Indeed, it has revealed itself throughout the 20'^ centurv'. Now,
however, as nation-states change, borders shift and migrants travel with greater rapidity our
awareness of the importance of studying political identity is burgeoning.
A traditional interpretation of the post-Cold War world holds that the communist
order, namely vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, stifled any identity-based conflicts which naturally
would have occurred in the absence of a central organizing power (Green, 1994: 145-146).
Hence, recent identity/nationalist-based conflicts since 1989/1991 in areas such as the
Balkans and Baltics reflect inevitable consequences. This project seeks to challenge such an
interpretation by arguing that there is nothing “natural” about these conflicts. Rather, the fall
of the communist order has allowed regional political/economic elites to strive for
intemational/regional attention, and in so doing they have mobilized their populations on the
basis of ehosen factors such as identity (including, for example, qualities such as race,
ethnicity, religion, language, customs, etc.).
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\Vli\ have these elites been seeking so much attention? One possibility is that
without the minimal material protection granted by the communist order (Green, 1994: 146),
individual nation-states now are in need of important resources—be the\’ ph\sical or
intellectual (e.g. leadership, civil society promotion, etc.). This has resulted in interstate
competition, which in several instances has been based upon the choice of identity, a choice
that I hold to be more arbitrary' than natural. Nevertheless, I acknowledge in this paper the
significance of questioning why the decision to rely upon identity for mobilization has been
so popular in certain regions of the post-Cold War world.
In keeping with the central argument of this writing, case studies have been taken
from the Balkans and the Baltics with respect to identity politics and nationalism. Prevalent
in this work is a constructivist approach to understanding identity-based conflicts.
Nevertheless, in order to frame the need for such an approach it is necessary to revisit some
of the texts which are considered fundamental to the dominant aspects of the discourse of IR.
However, this does not demand another tiring analysis of classical IR texts. Rather, I shall
give attention to their failures by virtue of what is absent in them with respect to identity
politics and nationalism. This of course requires some critical attention to the substance of
these texts without regurgitating all of their propositions or reviving familiar debates.
Realism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism still tend to remain part of the
dominant theoretical approaches to understanding and even practicing international relations.
Certainly, critical theorists of IR have responded by providing a wealth of studies
challenging the dominant discourse with respect to identity politics and nationalism. For this
reason it will be important to pause and chronicle how a reaction to the dominant discourse
has evolved. This requires giving attention to texts such as Morgenthau’s Politics Among
Nations, Waltz’ Theory ofInternational Politics and institutionalist literature.
As I argue with respect to my case studies, national and regional leaders in the
Balkans and Baltics, especially since the end of the Cold War, have been mobilizing their
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populations on the basis of identity. This has led in many instances to nationalist assertions
which themselves have flieled physical conflicts (Famen. 1994: 49-50). Prominent examples
include the former Yugoslavia in the Balkans and Latvia in the Baltics, though the Latvian
situation has differed in substance and has not erupted into the exact same t>pe of violence
that has occurred in the Balkans. Tliis does not imply, however, that the Latvian case is less
serious or less volatile.
Although regional/national elites often have relied upon historical conflicts, m\ths
and other phenomena in order to drive present-day disputes, I argue that many of the current
conflicts represent a hybridization of the old and the new, suggesting that identity-based
disputes do not represent renewals of ancient, timeless hatreds. Rather, they manifest
themselves as the efforts of leaders/elites seeking to preser\'e their status and the security of
those whom they allegedly represent. If historical progression were perfectly linear there
would exist a direct descent of customs/teachings preserv'ing those ^^ancient” hatreds.
However, historv' and subsequent generations do not perfectly maintain the past. To a
noticeable degree the past has been re-presented to the masses in such a way that events have
been retained selectively, without complete accurac>’ and certainly without a confidant level
of objectivity. (Objectivih’ tends to be lost at an early stage.) Nevertheless, it is not my
intention to introduce a paradigm w hich universalizes the study of identity-based conflict.
Such conflict has not always occurred in all regions of the post-Cold War world. Part of this
research will help to explain how it has occurred in some.
For the purpose of this writing, ‘‘identity groups” w ill encompass individuals at the
sub-national, national or transnational level who use a w ide variety of characteristics in order
to distinguish themselves from other groups. Examples of such characteristics include but
by no means are limited to race, ethnicity, religion, language, customs, etc. Furthermore,
these variables are prone to change (Walker in Drobizheva, 1996: 3), meaning that
sometimes certain characteristics assert themselves over the others. In fact, it could be
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argued that identity could be based on some veiy obscure characteristics if a particular
political situation or event demanded adherence to them. For instance, traditional
determinants of identity such as ethnicity could be overridden by factors such as class or
educational level. Tliis, however, is just one possibility.
Since an array of scholars and policymakers still adlieres to the theories propagated by
these and related texts, and since this endeavor deals with the post-communist world, it is
still relevant to pose a challenge in response to the traditional texts. However, it is also
important to note that thinking in IR has not followed a perfect linear progression, for
example, from Morgenthau to the critical theorists. To the contrary, a number of materials
taken from various historical periods is pertinent to my argument. Critical theorists have
made a tremendous effort in debunking nnths with respect to the artificial nature of identity
constmetion as well as the nationalism(s) that it can fuel. Yet it is still important to contrast
these efforts with the traditional approaches in order to demonstrate how the dominant
approaches in IR are defective and even dangerous for practitioners of international politics.
But how do we know that the traditional approaches are still dominant? One
response is “just observ'e”-—that is, just observ e the current foreign policies of states, many
of which outwardly call for diplomacy and peace but ultimately choose
militarism/force/sanctions when they allege that negotiation has failed (even if “negotiation”
never really took place). A quick glance at the classical te.xts I have chosen prompts any
scholar to ask why they have been selected given their marginal if not nonexistent treatment
of my topic. But this is exactly why such texts must be analyzed. They remain as
fundamental works within the discipline of IR yet despite the expectation that identity would
be deemed a part of the discourse, it is absent in them. Therefore, I provide a review of three
other texts which should serv'e as a transition toward the approach this writing takes in
relation to identity-based conflict in the post-communist world. These texts also serve as a
prelude and a foundation for the argument that is being advanced.
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Although a better understanding of constructi\ ist approaches will be made as this
writing progresses, at the least I take constructivism to include a process of understanding
how concepts, meanings and (socio-political) phenomena are created through an
intersubjective process (Wendt, 1992: 396), usually between a minimum of two actors at the
individual or group level. Constructivism also asserts the role of structures at the
international level as they relate to the creation of state interests (1994; 385). However, by
no means should it be assumed that interests or identities are pre-given or prior to social
interaction. Rendering an almost “Lacanian”' description of identity formation, Wendt
discusses how actors construct their identities in relation to the existence of others (1992:
404). Hence this project emplo\ s, in part, a sociological (and to an extent a psychological)
approach to understanding international relations. It focuses upon intertwining theory with
practice and demonstrating the close relationship between both, in spite of existing
perceptions which are reluctant to address the role of theory.
' Lacanian psychological theory, for e.xaniple, addresses the role of self and other, and how the self comes
to be defined by its relation to the other. See Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative
of the
Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanahlic Experience” in Robert Con Davis and Ronald Schleifer,
Conteniporarv Literary Criticism. White Plains, NY; Longman Publishing Group, 1994. pp. 381-386.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF CLASSICAL AND TRANSITIONAL TEXTS
Because a plurality of policymakers continues to practice international relations on the
basis of ideas stemming from the traditional theoretical approaches to IR, it is necessary to
give attention to the texts representing them. I use the term “traditional” because they have
created a dominant tradition reflected in the practice and theory of international relations,
especially since the end of the Second World War. Such texts reveal that their principles
have contributed to a self-fulfilling prophecy in which practitioners of international politics
believe that they provide the soundest approaches. However, when their policy choices
generate adverse consequences, policymakers, instead of challenging these approaches
actually adhere to and perpetuate them despite the flaws of their logic.
Consider, for example. Politics Among Nations. This work is treated as a “core” text
of IR but reveals its deficiencies regarding identity polities largely by what is absent in the
text. This is achieved through its insistence upon the state as a fundamental, primaix' actor
(e.g. in a world of bipolarity, multipolarity, etc.). The end result is that the te.xt overlooks
identity because the concept, if it were even vaguely considered by Morgenthau, becomes
reduced to state identity without discussing sub-national or transnational identities. Instead,
the concept of the “national interest” (Morgenthau, 1960: 562) tends to engulf the concept of
identity. Hence, an otherwise elaborate text such as this actually reveals itself to be
simplistic and uncritical. Furthermore, it contains a rather pessimistic outlook upon world
politics and human nature, which I argue has contributed to present-day cynicism toward
world affairs (e.g. conflict in the Balkans and the suggestion that a resolution is almost
impossible). This work is a strong starting-point for the self-fulfilling prophecies of IR. One
such means of achieving this relates to Morgenthau’s analysis of the status quo and the
importance he accords to it. The closest treatment of identity occurs through his brief
discussion of “nationalism” (1960: 368), w hich again tends to manifest itself as a concept
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applicable to the territorial state My project, however, coiicents itself with identities not
exclusively at the national level but at the sub-national level as well, I’olUics Among
Nations is less useftil for such an endeavor given that it hardly takes account of various
levels of identity-based groups. Yet many present-day practitioners of international affairs
adhere faithfiilly to the realist doctrine to the point where Morgenthau’s work becomes a
Standard IR textbook.
It certainly does not aid the cause of scrutinizing identity that Morgenthau defends
the primacy of power as it is applied to international politics. Although the definition and
understanding of this concept are quite murky it can be seen that nation-states continue to
assert their actions on the basis of what to them are fundamental concepts, such as power.
This IS problematic, for it can lead to mutual misunderstandings and exhibitions of national
hubris in order to promote an otherwise relative concept.
Moving \ears ahead. Theory of International I^olitics, respected as the founding text
of neorcalism, is especially insensitive to the intricacies of identity because of Waltz’
insistence upon the “advantages” (Waltz, 1979: 161) of bipolarity for a stable world. Again,
such a conception overlooks multiple and transnational identities. The attempt to create a
science (1979: 7) of international politics based upon microeconomic theory and structural
causes/factors negates the intersubjective nature of identity formation between states and
sub-national groups, or states and other states. In a sense, such an approach makes identity
formation almost deterministic. Similar to Morgenthau, Waltz builds his theor>’ upon ideas
which are not as conceptually concrete as they are presented, such as “interest” and
“power”—both of which can be redefined to demonstrate how sub-national and transnational
identities are manipulated by these concepts. Furthermore, if neorealist theory as
represented in Theory ofInternational Politics were as logically sound as it is claimed to be,
identity formation within nation-states would be far more predictable than it has been. The
fact that crises such as those in the Baltics and Balkans have occurred implies the weakness
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of neorcalist propositions. Distinct identities, as those possessed by members within
periphery states would become ftirther marginalized by state efforts to take cover beneath the
hegemonial umbrella of one of the major powers in a bipolar world. The result would be the
diminishing of identity-based conflicts—if neorealist theory were as powerful as its
followers claim that it is.
In considering ‘'Tlie Promise of Institutionalist Theor> ” by Keohane and Martin, one
finds an article that is ver\’ concise as it spells out some of the dominant/accepted viewpoints
of institutionalism. However, based upon this assessment it can be seen that institutionalist
theorv' also is problematic w ith respect to identity politics and the politics of identity.
Institutionalism tends to be perceived as conditionol^ meaning that state engagement in
institutions depends upon numerous factors including those related to self-interest and
rational utility maximizing. Moreover, it explicitly rejects the value of critical appraisals of
international affairs. While frowned upon b>' realist tenets, institutionalist theor>' still seeks
to apply various realist principles, or to show ‘‘under what conditions realist propositions are
valid” (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 42). It relies upon an application of logic which in
international relations often times is revealed as illogic. With respect to identity politics,
neoliberal institutionalism inadequately addresses issues related to sub-national and
transnational, as well as changing, identities. Given that institutionalism tends to focus upon
the incentives of states with respect to participation in institutions (1995: 44), one can
immediately notice the flaws of this theory w ith respect to identity politics. An
institutionalist might argue for example that no state would allow itself to enter into an
institution which might heavily tamper with its collectivized identity or identities. But since
institutionalism still privileges the role of state self-interest this is heavily problematic when
considering issues of identity, especially if competing identity groups complicate the
definition of their state's self-interest. EmpiricalK’ speaking, the post WWIl era has
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demonstrated that state interests do in faet change. For instance, no longer do Japan or
Germany tend to promote a militaristic agenda on the world stage (Ruggie, 1998: 863).
The following texts represent theoretical approaches whieh still remain subordinate to the
dominant ones largely beeause the dominant approaches stand to be threatened by their
challenging propositions. It is here that one finds a “dominant/emergent” (Williams in Con
Davis and Schleifer, 1980; 460) relationship between the traditional and the transitional.*
This t\pe of association arises when one kind of practice, in this case an academic one,
encounters another practice which poses a challenge to it. In such a scenario the dominant
practice (via its adherents) acknowledges the presence of the emergent. However, in an
attempt to resist the emergent practice adlierents of the dominant one often tr>- to subsume or
stifle it (1980: 460-461). Wlien translating this into the discourse of IR it is evident that
scholars of the traditional approaches have attempted to stifle the transitional ones by
actually choosing to address them. Although such scholars will give some credence and
attention to the ideas propounded by their colleagues, ultimately they seek to reassert the
superiority of the traditional theoretical approaches. This is how, in spite of the robust
critical studies literature, mainstream literature of IR has continued to retain its preeminence.
Ruggie, for example, introduces another dimension into the marginalization of critical
studies, or more specifically constructivist thought, by arguing that theorists of IR have
maintained a highly ‘‘narrow” (Ruggie, 1998: 880) outlook on the nature of the Social
Sciences. Given the constructivist divergence from realist and neoliberal causal mechanisms
(1998: 878-880), it is apparent that scholars of the more traditional approaches have
hesitated to welcome the research of critical studies.
“ The tenn “transitional” is not meant to imply the creation of a teleology but rather a mo\ ement away from
the established discourse and practice of international relations.
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In World ofOur Malang, Nicholas Onuf advances some of the elements of
structuration^ theorv as he attempts to build a constmetivist theorv' of ailes and aile in the
international realm. This text is a valuable starting-point for the presentation of the idea that
individuals and society are mutually constitutive. Carefully, Onuf warns however that
despite this claim the process of mutual constitution is not “done wholly out of mind” (Onuf,
1989; 40). Such a claim is highly applicable to this project, as it implies that agency and
interests are not pre-given, but that individuals and society nonetheless do not have complete
command of their self-formation. Although he agrees with the post-structuralist emphasis of
the role played by logocentrism^ in social interactions, Onuf distances himself from post-
structuralism, which he accepts as a more “radical” (1989: 40) position. This work relates
highly to my treatment of identity politics, for it suggests that the rules by which social
groups abide (or are expected to abide) are social constructs with no predetennined source.
As I argue, the concept of aile also is a social construct which does not possess an
absolute grounding point for its meaning. Onuf explicitly rejects the rigidity created by the
reliance upon binaries in order to describe the different categories of rules and rule. And
although he posits an alternative in which there are three categories for each (Onuf, 1989;
291), I am skeptical as to whether he too has formed a somewhat rigid paradigm.
Nevertheless, World ofOur Making SiW\c.u\dA.QS, the highly constructed nature of international
relations, and hence assists in presenting the notion that there is nothing natural or inevitable
about conflicts such as those based upon identity.
Alexander Wendt’s “Collective Identity Fonnation and the International State” relies
as well upon a more sociological approach to understanding international relations. It
provides much-needed attention to the concept of intersubjectivity between actors, and more
broadly addresses the role of social interaction among them. This essay veers from the
^ Onuf builds upon, in large part, stnicturalion ihcoiy as presented by Anthony Giddens in texts such as The
Constitution ofSociety.
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paradigm of rational-choice acting and attempts to account for the means by which actors’
identities and their political/social choices are formed. Moreover, it challenges neorealist
presuppositions about the fixed, predetermined nature of state-level interests. In this regard
Wendt’s piece establishes a foundation for the idea that interests do not necessarily fall into a
neat, determinable set of patterns.
Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities is a tremendously
valuable text, as it offers a more critical approach to understanding the nature of identity
politics and nationalism in the post-Cold War era. Composed of numerous short essays by a
diverse array of scholars, the text challenges the primacy of the role of the territorial state in
international relations. It brings to the reader’s attention the notion that the concept of
identity is less determinate than it is believed to be. This is especially so in light of the role
of political refugees, migrant workers and other immigrants. Challenging Boundaries
suggests that the concept of identity is susceptible to change, and that those states which
have asserted/abused their power also have sought to privilege the identity that they prefer
over the identities of those whom they have dominated. Moreover, this volume analyzes
how various groups of individuals have been left without a sense of origin or worse yet, how
the dominant powers have attempted to “erase” (Shapiro and Alker, 1996: 270) their sense of
self These essays help to reinforce my argument that many of the identity-based conflicts
occurring in the Balkans and Baltics have represented the efforts of dominant leaders/elites
attempting to assert the identity of those whom they represent over those whom they are
trv'ing to suppress.
The aforementioned texts as well as the critical studies texts that I rely upon in this
project share at least one trait in common: the anahsis of the role of anarchy and sovereignty
in the international sphere. Numerous writings have struggled w ith the concept of anarchy,
or the absence of a supreme authority above nation-states. Some have found it to be
Logoccntrisin can be understood as the pnvileging of the w ord.
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problematic whereas others at the same time found have it to be an indispensable concept.
My contention is that statehood and anarchy mutually constitute each other. There is
nothing natural or predetermined about the condition of anarchy. This also reveals the
constructed, malleable nature of state sovereignty. By suggesting that sovereignty is not a
concept existing m absolute it will be argued that conflicts arising out of identity crises are
not untreatable simply because they might exist strictly within the confines of a sovereign
state (Wendt, 1994: 388). One cannot adequately come to define the concept of sovereignty
without being familiar with the conditions ascribed to anarchy, and vice versa.
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CHAPTER 3
WHY CONSTRUCTIVISM?
As Onuf s work confirms, constmctivism is not a monolithic body with One uniform
philosophical approach. Scholars have attempted to categorize it, for example, on the basis
of structuralist and post-structuralist constructivism. I am tiying however, to avoid these
strict labels which suggest that each categorv' is mutually exclusive. Rather, mv approach
relies upon many elements of constructivism in an effort to adopt the role of the “bricoleur”
(Onuf, 1989: 105). That is to say, I intend to utilize various aspects of constmctivism as
they are needed throughout this project. Hence, my plan is not based upon a strict, narrow
conception of the utility of constmctivist thought.
Constmctivism tends to focus upon how' a particular discourse contributes to theory and
practice, for example, in international relations. On a basic level it accepts a reality that is
socially constmcted between agents—be they individuals, groups, etc. Nevertheless, this
reality is not entirely fabricated through the complete consciousness of the actors involved
(Campbell, 1998; 24-25). The more dominant theoretical approaches such as neorealism
tend to emphasize the role of stmcture in determining actor expectations and behavior. This
tends to rob individuals and groups of their agency, and it adds a strong element of
determinism to social reality. Furthermore, it does not question the incentives/motives of
those global “powers” contributing to the dominant discourse. Hence, the nature of social
reality simply is treated as the one and only reality, w ithout challenging the dominant
paradigms—many w hich have further constricted the freedom of groups experiencing crises
due to their identity or lack of identity. One alternative that I present holds that individual
agents are more free to act than might be thought, but that their freedom is heavily
constrained by the practices of elites.
The role of the absolute versus the relative also is fundamental to a constmctivist
challenge to the traditional approaches of IR. Of course, whenever the absolute/relative
13
binaiA' is discussed scholars tend to express strong skepticism toward the idea of relativity at
the conceptual level. They cast it off as dangerously nihilistic (Dillon, 1996; 129) and
valueless. Such a conception is misconstrued. By arguing for the relativity of concepts such
as anarchy, it is suggested that those concepts which have been so caicial to the discourse of
IR have not existed as a grounding point outside of all difference. This is where the utility of
deconstruction (Campbell, 1998; 20) appears. By showing the co-dependence of one
concept upon another, we can tr\- to avoid privileging one and marginalizing the other. More
importantly, we can recognize the social world (as it is treated through concepts) as far more
malleable and capable of change than the traditional approaches are willing to allow. In this
respect the end result is a rejection of phenomena such as identity-based conflict and
nationalism as natural, inevitable or continuous. Far too many scholars and policymakers
lack the awareness that they have greater mobility in liberating themselves from the
paradoxes and dead-end propositions set forth by the traditional texts.
One such binar>' in need of being “deconstructed” is that of self7other. Indeed, a number
of critical theorists has sought to do this. Throughout this research the self/other binaiy will
be considered at two levels. The first consists of the relationship between national leaders in
the Balkans and Baltics, and those whom they seek to portray as the other—meaning those
minorities whom they have persecuted. Examples include the Serb majority in the former
Yugoslavia and the ethnic Albanian minority in Kosovo, and the majority of ethnic Latvians
in Latvia and the ethnic Russian minority within that state\ The second level refers to the
regional and international forces that have created a self^other binary’. Here, I refer primarily
to the Western world and its attempt to “create” an other in relation to the inhabitants of
Eastern Europe and the former USSR. But the role of Russia in relation to Latvia also must
be explored. It will be crucial to e.xamine the role of alterity (See Lacan in Con Davis and
^ This is not to deny that incnibers of persecuted minorities ha\ e responded by cany ing out repressive aets
upon their designated ad\ ersaries.
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Schlcifer), or otherness” in relation to the formation of perceptions between sovereign
entities.
By employing a constructivist approach to this topic we are left with the suggestion that
national and regional leaders/elites have selected characteristics which are more arbitrary
than natural with respect to their engagement in identity-based conflicts. In other words,
there is nothing inevitable or predetermined about the choices that have been made in order
for one group to differentiate itself from another. However, I do not seek to imply that
identity is an irrelevant concept. Rather, there must be something ven,- appealing about it
that has prompted leaders/elites to choose it as a means of political mobilization. Although
this project explores in greater detail the possible motives of such leaders/elites, I will
suggest at this point that the qualities associated with identity, be they race, ethnicity,
religion, language, customs, etc., have such a strong tendency to be readily adopted by
groups that they can be used in order to (re)create identities. Because leaders can rely upon
the historical dimensions of these variables they also can manipulate them out of historical
context in order to mobilize their populations.
More broadly, a constructivist assessment asserts itself over the traditional theoretical
approaches because it does not simply accept the existing state of international affairs as
dictated b>’ forces beyond the reach of agents. Instead, it seeks to analyze how events such
as conflict have evolved, in the hope that if policy makers had a more critical understanding
of phenomena they would be less likely to repeat the same mistakes to which the traditional
approaches have led them. It seeks also to address the means by which social reality is
constructed between agents (Ruggie, 1998: 863). As a side note, it is interesting to think of
one approach not mentioned above—that of Marxism. If we were to read into a Marxian
treatment of identitv we would find that Marx thought suggests that identity would become
less troublesome as classes and nation-states dissolve (Tucker, 1978: 488). Obviously this
has yet to occur, and few can be certain that even if such dissolution could occur the
15
disappearance of nation-states would be desirable. Yet, it is interesting to conceit
Marxian discourse offers an alternative understanding of identity—one based not
religion, race, etc., but rather upon status as a proletarian.
, e of how
on
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CHAPTER 4
APPLICATIONS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO IDENTITY-BASED
POLITICS
What then, is the special utility of my approach with respect to identity-based conflict in
the post-Cold War era? Although I do not seek to provide a panacea for the ills of identity
conflict and nationalism, 1 believe that much progress can be made away from the
constraints of the dominant theoretical approaches. Common to these approaches is a highly
problematic element made difficult by a narrow', pessimistic outlook. It relates to the
concept of self-interest. Realism, neorealism and institutionalism tend to place limits upon
the amount of mutual benefits to be gained in international relations because of the
presumption that states are continuing to advance their own interests, even at the expense of
others (keohane and Martin, 1995: 42-44). These schools survive because they mislead
representatives of states sovereignh' into believing that self-interest is the foremost, if not
the only, telos or end. My argument concerns itself with the notion that the preoccupation
with state self-interest is much too excessive or at the least, misdirected. Because interests
now are applying to identity-based groups which often transcend geographical borders, and
because identities are not static but d\iiamic it will be increasingly difficult to define
interests solely based upon the physical state. Of course policymakers and elites still
overlook this idea, and hence promote the traditional tenets of IR. But the nation-state is a
fusion of two concepts; nation and state. If the primacy of nation overshadows that of state,
or vice versa, how severe will the political consequences be*^ State self-interest then, is
overvalued or misperceived. Representatives of sovereignty grasp hold of this concept as a
guiding principle, thereby bypassing any popular interests that might apply beyond the
boundaries of the physical state.
Although the idea of the physical state and its interests cannot be cast off, states do have
incentives to stray from “power politics”. The applications of the traditional conceptions of
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international relations frequently create adverse circumstances for all actors involved in a
particular conflict. For example, the U.S./NATO coalition, in choosing a bombing campaign
in the former Yugoslavia in 1999 actually complicated prospects for regional stability. How
is this so? One reason relates to the uneasiness about the fhture of Serbia and its fellow
provinces after international forces leave Kosovo. By refusing to pursue a more critical
understanding of the Balkan conflict, the U.S.AVest rejected diplomacy and further
complicated an already tense situation. Although the current situation in Latvia is not as
volatile, a similar analysis applies. Russia, by insisting upon greater rights and protection of
ethnic Russians in Latvia, has contributed to a greater distancing between ethnic Latvians
and ethnic Russians (Rudenshiold. 1992: 609). This has come frequently at the expense of
ascribing pejorative qualities to the “other”— i.e. ethnic Latvians.
Another implication regarding the role of identity-based conflict, to be considered in
greater depth later in this paper, is that international forces also are responsible for the
burgeoning of regional conflicts. In efforts to cling to tautological principles based on self-
interest, states from the Western world have contributed to a gross misrepresentation of the
affairs in other states. To an extent this has been done in order to devise an adversar\’ and
perpetuate the need for an active foreign policy (Neumann, 1996: 23). By choosing to define
Balkan conflict within the past decade as a function of natural, historical hatreds, the
U.S.AVest have portrayed non-Western states in a disparaging light. Yet, as I will argue, it
has been the work of certain regional elites/leaders in these troubled states who have served
as the actual adversaries—not just of the West but in many cases of humanity. In the case of
the Baltics, for example, Russia has sought to portray ethnic Latvians as an obstacle to the
welfare of ethnic Russians. However, it has not proposed any political solutions which will
accommodate all inhabitants of Latvia, be they ethnic Russians or ethnic Latvians. It is
unlikely that there ever will be a foolproof vaccination against the outgrowth of international
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misperceptions so as long as media elites, narrow-minded diplomats^ or abusive leaders
continue pursuing their perverse agendas.
Finally, there is a need to uncover some possible factors leading to the choice of identity
as a means of mobilization. Although I reject most identit>
-based conflicts to be the product
of timeless, historical hatreds, I suspect that leaders/el ites can rely upon historical
information in order to generate new conflicts. In this regard, it is my contention that
identity-based crises in post-Communist states are not continuations of older conflicts but
rather conflicts based upon the beliefthat they are extensions of older feuds. This is an
important difference. It suggests the strong degree to which identity-based conflicts have
been constructed by leaders/elites seeking to promote themselves and those whom thev
claim to represent. Hybridization has allowed elites, in part, to construct the realities of their
nation-states.
^ Consider, for e.xainple the notion that the diplomat has changed from sovereign representative to more of
a medium for coin eying information betw een heads of state. See Luard, ed., Basic Texts in International
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CHAPTER 5
THEORETICAL BASIS: IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM
Understanding the crux of my argument entails a fairly close look at the concepts of
identity and nationalism. Identity is a concept which, in large part, allows one body of
individuals to distinguish itself from another on the basis of attributes that, as history has
demonstrated, are heavily arbitrary. In other words, there is nothing absolute or natural
about using religion, ethnicity or even language to explain what identity is. In the context of
the post-communist world ethnicity has been a strong determinant of identity. But, as I
would argue, it mistakenly has been confused as a synonym for identity. This has allowed
regional elites to mobilize members of their respective ethnicities in order to create a drive
toward survival in the absence of the totalitarian order.
Nevertheless, it is imperative to dissect the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic conflict. As
Walker claims, doing so requires us to “demolish the notion that 'ethnic conflict' represents a
unique phenomenon or that [post-communist conflicts] are best understood in terms of the
unchanging ethnic identities of the participants” (Walker in Drobizheva, 19%: 3). Rather,
ethnicity and identity frequently are linked together when a particular body of political elites
wishes to accomplish a particular objective. Since social and/or political objectives change
with time and historical context, elites often have used different criteria to impose a specific
identity upon various groups of people. This forces us to rethink the concept of identity; it
casts doubt upon the idea that ethnicity and identity are historically fixed and so rigid that
they always resurface and reintroduce old conflicts. Interests change, as do identities. One
should never overlook the primacy of historical context.
As a side note, but nonetheless an important one, historical context can be a difficult
concept with which to deal. This results from the broadness of the conditions to which it
might refer. It is not my intention simply to characterize every volatile event as the product
Relations, pp. 439-442.
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of historical context, or to be reductionistic with respect to this concept, Howe\ er, the
importance of historical context still remains crucial to the constructivist approach put
forward in this writing. This is one area in which the traditional approaches appear to be
deficient. They tend to assert a paradigm of predicting events in international affairs, yet
they ignore the changing d\Tiamics of historical context. This is not, of course, to claim that
historical context always changes over night. Rather, it can take anywhere from over night
to over decades or even longer. But given the uncertainty of knowing what conditions will
arise between and within states, it is difficult to understand how approaches such as that of
the neorealists (for example) can boast of having such tremendous predictive power. For
this reason, the constructivist approach offers a more prudent examination of international
affairs w ithout relying upon generalizations about the actions/behavior of states or groups of
states.
As David Campbell suggests, understanding (for example) the nature of the
formation of identity politics rests upon tracing how identity and the events it influences are
constructed (Campbell, 1998; 4), (In fact, this is not an entirely original claim, for the
constaictivist school of thought tends to endorse the utility of “how” over “w hy” in large
part.) Seeking to understand how concepts and events are constructed avoids the fixation of
searching for set, definitive causes which deceivingly appear to ground meaning in absolute.
This is part of the task of deconstruction—an event that exposes those relationships of
supplementarity which help to define our concepts (1998: 4-6). And where the Balkan crisis
is concerned some of the most important concepts to consider are “ethnicity, nationalism,
identity, violence” (1998: 23). For if scholars adliere to the traditional acceptance of these
concepts as fixed and absolute, there will be no space allowed in which to consider them
constructs and hence not the result of an unchangeable, natural order. The alternative
presents us w ith the possibility of challenging the assumed usage of concepts such as
identity, upon w hich so much of current conflicts rest.
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How has identity been deconstructed in order to reveal the process by which it has
acquired meaning? In essence, the creation of identity has been exposed through the
conception of the self/other binary. Yet, as Neuman warns, there is nothing natural about the
self (Neuman, 1996: 2). Identity is tremendously based in difference, but difference is based
upon an arbitrary set of characteristics or qualities such as ethnicity and religion. When
treating the matter of Balkan conflict it will be imperative to consider how ethnic Albanian
Muslims in relation to Orthodox Christian Serbs have been depicted as the “other” hv elite
Serbian political leaders, a performative act which can spread into the minds of the Serbian
masses and then be adopted as an ascendant view. Conversely, it can be understood that
oppressed Kosovars would adopt a similar view of Christian Serbs as the “other”. In this
regard both groups would appear to celebrate their own difference but resent that of their
opposites. However, both parties would come to ignore or overlook a means bv which they
could be thought to have a similar identity—that of citizens of the same state or federation
(and more specifically, until the beginning of this decade, Yugoslavs).
With respect to the self/other binarv and identity formation, it is crucial to
acknowledge identity not as having meaning on its own but rather by depending upon those
w ho serve as the “other”. This implies that the underpinnings of identity rely upon concepts
w hich are mutually constitutive (Campbell, 1998: 23). In relation to the subject of the
Kosovo crisis, then, one can see that Christian Serbs and ethnic Albanian Muslims depend
upon each other to define w ho they are. Tliis denies each ethnicity superiority over the other
and rejects the claim that by virtue of w ho these people are their differences naturally are
irreconcilable and hence must lead to bitter feuds. Similarly, ethnic Latvians acquire their
identity vis-a-vis the presence of ethnic Russians within and outside of Latvia, and vice
versa.
However, in spite of the visibility of these ideas at the conceptual level, the process
of identity formation does not always allow those whose identity is being formed to realize
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how they gain their identity. The end result often times tends to be an inclination toward
referencing the “others” as “strangers” (Neuman, 1996; 1 1). Furthermore, the implications
of this event can be dangerous if the other is deemed a culprit, or more explicitly, an enemy.
From a more e.xternal perspective, meaning that of the U.S. and NATO countries, it should
be taken into consideration that, regretfully, “foreign policy is generally about making an
other” (1996: 23). If this is so, perhaps scholars and policymakers need to be made aware of
the dangers behind estranging themselves from the Serbs and their governmental leaders
—
an action which potentially could hinder any Western-based peace initiatives.
Nationalism also has played a role in relation to identity politics in the post-Cold
War world. In the Balkans, for example, it has been intertwined with the Serbian “national
nnth” (Denitch, 1994: 1 17). For the sake of this analysis nationalism is to be taken as a
political construct. It does not by necessity represent the sentiment that a group of people,
through race or ethnicity, is synon> mous with a particular geographical entity and therefore
entitled to defend it at all costs. A more careful look reveals that nationalism largely is the
product of past political events or issues revived for “contemporary political goals”
(Campbell, 1998: 86). If this is so, then nationalism must be realized not as a phenomenon
which represents in absolute the claims of one group of people over those of another. In the
case of the fomier Yugoslavia I treat the matter of nationalism as a concept relied upon by
Serbian political/governmental elites to rally their “own” against the Kosovars. More will be
mentioned about this when discussing how domestic actors have shaped identity politics and
fueled recent conflicts.
Concerning sovereignty, it too is better understood as a social construct. This
challenges older assumptions which look toward some transcendental element of sovereignty
to characterize it as unchangeable. However, as Biersteker and Weber explain, sovereignty
is socially constaicted as it is created via “mutual recognition” (Biersteker and Weber, 1996:
2-3) between nation-states. The cmx of the sovereignty issue resides in the question of
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whether it exists in relation to a particular group of people, the territorial space which the>
inhabit (1996: 2), or something entirely different. Wlien relating this to the topic of Balkan
conflict, analyzing sovereignty is important in questioning whether it belongs to the Serbs as
a people, the Serbs and the Kosovars (and all provincial peoples of the former Yugoslavia)
by virtue of a shared territory, or to some other political entity
Understanding how identity and nationalism have been fabricated in the post-communist
world entails acknowledging that the presence of multiple groups of different identities in a
given state does not mean that mutual intolerance naturally will occur. Diverse groups Ime
coexisted and still do in various regions of the world despite differences in religion,
ethnicity, language, culture, etc. Beginning to understand how identity and nationalism have
been made problematic does not always demand that we search far back across the centuries
to observe how these concepts have become salient. Rather, one need not go further back
than the era of the Soviet Union itself to study how identity politics has been catalyzed in
such a way that it breeds nationalistic calls. Explosions of ethnic conflict have been
erroneously portrayed. Distinct bodies of people have lived amongst one another in the post-
Communist world, man>’ mixed together like two different chemical compounds refusing to
explode or react. One catalyst to consider is that of cthnofederalism within the Soviet
Union, to w hich I w ill first give my attention. The next e.xample of the nature of identity
politics w ill be illustrated through the case of Latvia with respect to cthnofederalism.
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CHAPTER 6
SOVIET ETHNOFEDERALISM
As a tool for the “...politicization of ethnicity” (Roeder, 1991: 197), this practice
ultimately arranged for tensions to occur within those republics designated to be different by
virtue of ethnicity. Essentially, ethnofederalisni was a means by which Sov'iet political elites
sought to organize their regime by preventing the pursuit of industrial growth from being
hindered by potential inter-group rivalries. Members of the numerous Soviet states w ould
indeed be represented at the national level. However, there was a catch to this. Groups of
different ethnicities across the various states would receive representation, but this would
occur through officially-appointed leaders who were strictly forbidden from practicing a
form of politics that would be sensitive to the w ill of those w hom they represented (1991:
203). From a speculative standpoint, Russia’s actions have represented a desire to regain its
power, prestige and imperialistic-like authority.
With ethnofederalisni, it can be seen that the inadequate representation of the
interests of different ethnic groups prevented individuals w ithin these groups from
developing agendas that conflicted w ith Soviet ideology. Simultaneously, the leaders who
did represent their respective regions were transformed from etlmic representatives to elite
party members^ whose objectives no longer aimed at addressing the particularities of states
w ith diverse bodies of individuals. In turn, these officials institutionalized ethnicity in the
political sphere, making way for what eventually would become ethnic rivalries. In order for
particular groups to vie for their interests, they were obliged to defer to their elite party
members who were in large part responsible for allocating resources. Although this worked
well for some ethnic groups it constrained minority groups from pursuing objectives in the
’ Although, other national elites, who were not appointed by the communist party, continued to coe.xist w ith
those w ho became elites by the authority of the party.
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same fashion (Roeder, 1991: 206). This ftirther heightened the potential for conflict with the
impending dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Because national political elites were seen to be the authorities capable of prox iding
ethnic and identity-based groups with resources, Soviet states increasingly fell victim to
groups w ho associated nationalism w ith survival. How' is this so, if the intent of
ethnofederalism was to prevent inter-group conflicts'^ Essentially, the Soviet system of
ethnofederalism provided no means by which sub-national or even international groups
could interact with each other politically so as to bargain or negotiate for their objectives.
Instead, identity-based groups became dependent upon looking upward to communist elites
(Batt and Wolczuk, 1998: 94). Hence the Soviet system, consciously or unconsciously,
encouraged action through calls for nationalism as opposed to interetlmic negotiations or
agreements. In some instances, the Soviet system fabricated even greater ethnically-based
conflicts by leading sub-national groups to believe that they constituted and were deserving
of their own nation-state: ‘‘the communist federal system had even created nations out of
ethnic groups which had previously been unaware of, or uncertain as to their political
identity” (1998: 94-95).
How' then, did Soviet ethnofederalism provide for the conditions which w ith the fall
of communism triggered ethnic rivalries and calls for nationalism? One such means
concerns the former communist leaders themselves. With the creation of independent,
sovereign republics communist leaders who were once loyal to the Soviet communist party
were forced to look elsew here for support. By appealing to the nationalistic calls of those
whom they represented, these officials reinforced the perception that ethnic assertions and
reliance upon nationalism were justifiable means for engaging in politics. During the era of
the Soviet Union such leaders were far less accountable to those whom they (supposedly)
represented. With the creation of independent republics, however, they w ere required to find
some means of acquiring support. Introducing a nationalistic ideology was a strong
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mechanism for rallying the confidence of those groups whom they sought to represent. In
many cases this included an association with more extreme nationalist groups whose beliefs
encompassed racist attitudes tied with ethnic pride (Batt and Wolczuk, 1998: 95).
Moreover, there is evidence that in a multitude of former Soviet republics national
elites were acquiring more power prior to the fall of communism. As this occurred, they
continued to mobilize the groups that they represented in order to compete for important
resources from the central communist party. Increasingly, minority groups failed to obtain
adequate representation and often suffered from insufficient resource allocation (e g. Jews)
(Roeder, 1991. 206). Furthermore, the mobilization of different ethnic groups transformed
many of these collectivities into “interest” (Glazer and Moynihan quoted in Roeder, 1991:
203) groups, again suggesting that the notion of identity is malleable and subject to
manipulation.
In retrospect, Soviet ethnofederalism serv'ed as a highly divisive means of organizing
different identity-based groups. Although it seemingly prevented volatile conflicts
throughout most of the existence of the Soviet Union, ultimately it contributed to the fall of
the USSR. But upon dissolution of the communist order, the legacy of Soviet
ethnofederalism established a situation whereby a number of republics faced challenges
created by the political structure of the totalitarian order (although it must be realized that
not all former Soviet republics have suffered from heated ethnic conflicts).
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CHAPTER 7
ETHNIC CONFLICT IN LATVIA
With respect to the role of identity-based conflict and nationalism in Latvia, there
exists a mixed record of results. However, this record suggests once again that the behavior
of the Soviet Union greatly influenced how etlinic conflict was/has been constructed in its
former republics. And again, it is necessarv to reiterate the argument that I am advancing;
namely, that identity-based conflicts in the regions I am studying usually have been shaped
by political and economic elites, especially when material or security interests have been at
stake. But as the case of Latvia also suggests, ethnic conflicts and drives for nationalism are
anything but the product of natural, irremediable forces and causal factors. As Rudenshiold
claims, “independence in the Baltics has been no panacea,” but rather a potential ethnic
problem based on a “...strong Soviet legacy” (Rudenshiold, 1992: 609). Again, this
reinforces the notion that ethnic conflicts in the post-communist world are not by any means
natural, but rather the product of decisions made during the reign of totalitarianism.
(Although, I disagree with Rudenshiold's description of ethnic conflict as having been
rejuvenated. Perhaps a better temi would be “constituted” or “reconstituted” )
Latvia currently consists of a roughly fifty-fifty split between ethnic Latvians and
non-indigenous individuals, with a recent increase in ethnic Russians (Rudenshiold, 1992;
613-614). During the era of the Cold War the Soviet Union sought to establish industries in
its various regions, a maneuver which spawned an increase in Russian migration to the area.
This approach was followed by a general Soviet unwillingness to encourage ethnic
integration among the population. Instead, many closely-knit Russian collectivities formed
in Latvia. To date, enormous complexities have arisen as a result of this arrangement. For
example, legislation at the national level has been infused with efforts to promote objectives
strictly coinciding with the interests of ethnic Russians. However, ethnic Latvians have of
course responded with countermeasures of their own, such as efforts to make their language
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the official national language. This in turn has prompted Russian reactions, creating a
vicious cycle of activity (1992: 609).
Wlio or what then has been responsible for this precarious situation in Latvia,
especially since the fall of the Soviet Union? A simplistic analysis, w hich assumes ethnic
rivalries and calls for nationalism to be rooted in unending histories does not account for
such a case. Once again, w e must focus on those elites/communist party members who were
heavily responsible for constructing the present situation in Latvia. Upon creating the
conditions that allowed Russians to migrate into Latvia the communist party refused to
encourage full integration, thus projecting the images of ethnicity and identity to be rigid and
incapable of change. But it is quite evident that in the matter of Russia and Latvia their
peoples have not shared a deeply-rooted, ancient historical conflict which translates into
inevitable, unchanging disputes.
In terms of manipulating one population against or in opposition to another, the case
of Russia and the Baltics calls to mind what I refer to as “passive mobilization”. In the era
of Stalin, one finds a tremendous amount of propaganda made by the Soviet leader w ith the
intent of embellishing Russian characteristics over those belonging to inhabitants of the
satellite states. On various occasions Stalin tried to assert the superiority of Russian qualities
throughout the USSR. This placed a heavy strain upon members of the Baltic states, who
were tr>ing to protect and maintain their own cultural practices (Vizulis, 1985: 94). Hence,
by “passive mobilization” I mean that the Russian population learned to differentiate itself
from the other through indoctrination sponsored by a minority of cultural and political elites.
As attitudes of superiority evolve over the years it becomes easier to understand how
Russians in the present might support nationalist rhetoric which presents others as inferior.
Yet, how- many of them understand the intense struggles underw ent by members of the
Baltic states (such as Latvia) in order to retain their cultural characteristics in the face of
threats generated by a nation with imperialistic ambitions? Passive mobilization, then.
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reduces to the idea that members of the population do not necessarily have to engage
arduously in nationalist activity to acquire a pro-nationalist outlook or support for nationalist
policies.
A further effect of the Russian perspective on Latvia and the Baltics has been the
historical creation of the classification “[sovereign] state or Russian colony” (Vizulis, 1985:
95). Given that scholars have readily acknowledged the categorizing of Latvia as one of
these two entities, it is noteworthy that the actions of political elites during the era of the
Soviet Union and now in the Russian Federation have attempted to de-legitimize the
integrity of Baltic states. But this is largely what my writing has been about; namely, the
construction of political identity as a concept which depends upon another concept for
meaning. Latvians are not inherently “colonists”. Rather, the decisions of political, cultural
and economic elites in Russia have contributed to the conflision behind recognizing Latvian
identity. A more critical understanding of the d\ namics of identity in Latvia requires one to
consider the motives of leaders in Russia and how leaders in Latvia have responded. The
usage of mutually exclusive categories such as colony/sovereign state invites itself to be
deconstructed.
The Latvian case also is a strong reminder of the attention given to the concept of
the diaspora in the post-Cold War world. Given the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the
creation of successor states throughout the region has bolstered scholarly examinations of
bodies of people with shared origins who are living away from the homeland. This might
lead individuals to accept that the existence of diasporas will likely create volatile situations
throughout the former communist states. But is this always the case? Does the presence of
one body of individuals with a common heritage, living outside of its homeland, necessitate
that the home state actively will tr\' to advance the interests of its people?
Consider this statement from Charles King and Neil J. Melvin: “Politics, not
identity, has been the major determinant of when and how successfully foreign policy has
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reflected existing ethnic linkages” (King and Melvin, 1999: 118), Their research suggests
that issue-areas based on factors such as identity do not inevitably yield active measures
taken by the homeland. Rather, a more specific political motive has to exist in order for one
state to become seriously involved in monitoring the welfare of its “own” living in the
abroad. Economic incentive might account for part of this motive. If Russia believes that its
migrants to Latvia can fare well abroad and not pose a direct burden to the suffering Russian
economy, it might encourage the advancement of the interests of ethnic Russians in Latvia.*
Or if Russia itself believes that ethnic Russians can contribute to better prospects for foreign
investment in Latvia, it might be inclined to protect the interests of its population living
abroad. Still another factor compelling Russia to scrutinize the conditions of Russians in
Latvia simply might relate to its ambitions to revive old imperialistic pursuits (See
Rudenshiold). And yet, ironically, not even Russia has in its possession a consensus as to
what its more ambitious goals are. One, for example, includes the idea that it wishes to
become more similar to Western Europe. As Neumann warns, though, the Russian
conception of Europe is highly subjective and to a large extent has been created by Russians
themselves (Neumann, 1996: 2). But with the specter of Soviet imperialism still alive
amongst certain politicians and opportunists in Russia, it is not surprising that there is such
great concern for the affairs of ethnic Russians living in states which used to form parts of
the USSR.
This last statement is not especially difficult to accept, in light of the legacy of
Soviet communism. Consider this passage by King and Melvin:
The So\ iet Union, although supposedly based on the w ithering away of etlmic
allegiances, privileged etluiicity as a source of individual identity and a focus
of group solidarity... Both indi\’iduals (tlirough etlmic designations on internal
passports) and entire populations (tlirough the administrati\ e stmeture of the state)
w ere defined by their etlmic pro\ enance—a form of identic that was itself in many
* Although this is somew hat speculative, it is meant to suggest that there are other alteniati\es to
understanding the nature of identity-based disputes.
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cases consciously constnicted by Soviet ethnograpliers, linguists, and historians in
Uie early years after the Bolshex ik Revolution. (King and Mel\ in, 1999; 117 )
Again, the dy namics of etlmofedcralism are revealed. More importantly, this passage
demonstrates some of the means by which identity was constructed by past Soviet regimes.
Of course, it is not likely that such regimes gave equal attention to ethnic Russians living
within the various Soviet territories. As the current situation in Latvia implies, identity is
more intensely politicized when a state such as Russia is try ing to exercise particular
interests between itself and another state. The measures taken by individuals such as
ethnographers and linguists during the Soviet era confirm the degree of effort behind
attempts to fulfill imperialistic drives and ambitions. However if it is not in a state's interest,
as represented by a certain elite body, to act on behalf of its ethnic population living abroad,
intervention will not necessarily occur (1999: 1 16). This suggests that identity-based
disputes/conflicts do not arise by virtue of natural forces or inevitable sequences of events.
Successor states such as Latvia also serve as entities helping to reinforce the Russian
post-Soviet identity. With the presence of ethnic Russians living abroad, the homeland can
boast of being a regional power with deep trans-border ethnic ties (King and Melvin, 1999:
120). Although this does not necessarily hint at Russian ambitions to restore an imperialistic
state, it suggests a drive toward establishing a culturally dominant Russia elevated above the
new post-communist countries. In this respect, diaspora politics have been an elitist
“invention” (1999; 120) used to provide direction to Russian regimes in light of post-Cold
War uncertainties. Hence, one finds a partial explanation for maneuvers taken by figures
such as fonner President Yeltsin on behalf of Russian populations living outside of the
Russian Federation. In sum, it is striking to note, as King and Melvin have done, that
homeland interventions for the sake of an ethnic minority do not necessarily occur unless a
particular political motive arises. Conversely, attachment toward the homeland does not
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necessarily arise without a particular political or economic motive; not simply some obscure
sense of loyalty toward the physical state of origin.
Before proceeding, my discussion of elites must be extended and further explained.
Thus far I have used the term to refer to a minority of individuals, usually of great material
wealth, whose interests reside in perpetuating their ow n status w ithin the confines of their
ow n state or across borders. Speaking in contemporary terms, elites consists of individuals
such as legislators (at all, but especially the national level), governmental executives,
judiciaiy figures and other governmentally elected/appointed officials. However, elites do
not necessarily have to be directly involved w ith government on any level in order to retain
their status. A number of elites such as individuals of the business class or intelligentsia also
exercises its interests by virtue of its relative power either as a voting bloc or through
individual lobbying efforts. But elites also could consist of prominent celebrities or
figureheads of popular culture. If we were to assess the nature of elites in the more distant
past we w ould find that they consisted of members of the nobility, w herever a noble class
still existed. In the case of Latvia a number of nobles under the Russian regime of Kerensky,
earlier in the 20'*’ century, acted to complicate the prospects for creating a lasting, sovereign
Latvian state (Kaslas, 1976: 50). Interestingly, while the ''...Russian intellectual class
sympathized w ith the Latvian people, the local nobility suppressed [them] with so much
violence” (1976: 48).
A presence of multiple identity-based groups in states such as those of the Baltics
also yields mindfulness toward the concept of national "fitness” (Clemens, Jr. in Szporluk,
1994: 185). This term refers to a group’s abilitj’ to maintain its cultural practices, features
and customs—essentially, its shared memories and lifestyles (1994: 185). Scholars have
been quick to measure the level of fitness for indigenous groups in states such as Latvia.
Some have found that despite threats from the Russian homeland Latvia has maintained its
sense of national fitness. The other side of this matter, however, is applicable to ethnic
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Russians in Latv ia. With the creation of a sovereign Latv ian state w hat are the dynamics of
ethnic Russians’ sense of fitness?
Wliat this suggests is that the awareness of concepts such as national fitness actually
can contribute to divisiveness between different identity-based groups. Again, the attempt
here is not to be culturally insensitive but to strive toward an understanding of the state
w hich can encompass multiple ethnicities, etc. When w e examine the case of the Baltic
states we find that concerns over reconciling the existence of multiple identity-based groups
have been motivated by the political changes of the post-Cold War world. In a sense, one
could rely upon Biblical analogies to address these changes: similar to the awareness brought
to Adam and Eve of being unclothed in the Garden of Eden after partaking of the forbidden
fruit, ethnic Russians in Latvia have been made aw are of their precarious position w ithout
the protection of the Soviet regime. How ever, this awareness is largely a construction
influenced by elite Russian figures w ho have attempted to politicize the role of ethnicity in
light of the dissolution of the USSR. My point here is that the highly politicized nature of
post-communist affairs has endangered the prospects for intrastate compatibility between
members of different ethnic groups in states such as Latvia. As a result, drives tow ard ethnic
Russian citizenship (Clemens, Jr. in Szporluk, 1994: 196) in Baltic states have become
complex, dense issue-areas furthering regional tensions and misunderstandings.
Far from having solved its ethnic and nationalistic dilemmas, Latvia, however, has
experienced some promising trends w ith respect to the coexistence of Russians and Latvians.
For example, the better employment opportunities presented to migrating Russians have
provided them with fewer reasons to feel antagonistic toward ethnic Latvians with whom
they might have to interact. There also is some evidence indicating that Latvian political
figures have sought to promote more peaceful efforts in contending with issues created by
the presence of ethnic Russians (Clemens, Jr. in Szporluk, 1994: 196). This has been
especially true with the granting of independence to Latvia, given its convictions about how
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It was illegitimately annexed to the Soviet Union before the Cold War (Kaslas, 1976: 613-
614). Hence, although Latvia is far from having solved its identity-based problems, the fact
that the end of Soviet Union initially prompted some feelings of relief for Latvia
demonstrates the profound effect it had on constructing ethnic conflicts and calls for
nationalism. This adds another dimension to the phenomenon of ethnic conflict in the post-
communist world.
Now, however, the Soviet legacy continues to plague “transition” states such as
Latvia because despite the demise of the Soviet Union its fomier central state (i.e. Russia)
refuses to alleviate the tensions caused by issues of ethnicity and nationalism. For example,
although Latvia is no longer tied to a central authority its population of ethnic Russians
relentlessly draws attention from Russia itself In 1992 the Russian government under Boris
Yeltsin made appeals against Latvia in order to protect ethnic Russians from what it
perceived as laws discriminating against them (Drobizheva, 1996: 140).
Might the Russian government have a plausible case? Quite possibly. However, the
point here is that actions taken during the Soviet era have continued to complicate ethnic
relations throughout post-communist states. These actions also have contributed to a narrow
conception of ethnic conflict as something concrete and absolute which must be treated as if
it were incapable of being assuaged. Moreover, evidence exists which suggests how national
leaders such as Yeltsin himself have appealed to stereot\pical representations of non-
Russians in order to mobilize public sentiments against former communist states such as
Latvia. And by no means have these efforts been limited to attitudes toward the Baltics
(Drobizheva, 1996: 140). They imply that current political elites have sought to mobilize
their populations in a period of economic, political and social instability—that is, the post-
Cold War era.
The foregoing discussion of ethnofederalism in the Soviet Union and more
specifically, in Latvia, reveals how the politics of identity and nationalism do not represent
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forces grounded with the beginning of time or the modern world. Rather, they often are
politically constructed by economic and political elites—a minority of individuals seeking to
promote particular interests. As I would argue, var\- rarely have identity-based groups had
the opportunity to think critically about their own histories. But would the previous
discussion also apply to “transition” states that are more notorious for the presence of bitter
ethnic conflict, such as those of the Balkans? With this question in mind I turn now to an
analysis of the Yugoslav situation since the end of the communist order.
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CHAPTER 8
ETHNIC CONFLICT AND NATIONALISM: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
On the surface it can be seen how students, scholars and polics makers would be
intimidated when given a chance to analyze the problems of ethnic conflict and belligerence
in the Balkans—especially with regard to the former Yugoslavia. A number of historians, in
an effort to describe the dynamics of ethnic conflict in the Balkans, have presented current
identity-based crises as the product of mutual hatreds dating back to the 13*^ century. The
Medieval Serbian Empire, for example, has been cited as an epoch contributing to the notion
that the Balkans will be forever tainted by endless ethnic strife. Moreover, historians have
referred to dated conflicts between Muslims and Christians as a source of the problems
which have revealed themselves since the end of the Cold War (Samar\', 1995: 36). In the
introduction to his edited volume, Larrabee narrowly assumes that the conclusion of the
Cold War has “unleashed long-submerged historical antagonisms” (Larrabee, 1994: xii) in
the Balkans. This statement constrains the potential for an innovative outlook on affairs in
the region. Hence the title of his volume. The Volatile Powder Keg, analogizes Balkan
ethnic/identity-based conflict as the product of “chemical” instability, if you will.
How accurate is this interpretation, however? A more critical analysis reveals that
during the life of the Medieval Serbian Empire, Christians and Muslims were quite capable
of coexisting without demonstrating the hostilities which have consumed the Balkans during
the 1990's. As Samar>' suggests, the Serbian Empire actually experienced a tremendous
amount of success while possessing a vast amount of diversity. If anything, the onset of the
modern nation-stale and the identities constructed by it leads us toward a better
understanding of the historical origins of etlinic conflict in the Balkans (Samaiy, 36: 1995).
However, it also leads us away from acceptance of the belief that by virtue of being
Christian/Serb or Albanian/Muslim (for example), ethnic conflicts and drives toward
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nationalism occur as naturally as do the elements. But there is no “Periodic Table” of ethnic
hostilities.
Banac, for e.xample, makes an assumption contrary' to the approach taken in this
writing with regard to identity-based conflict. He infuses the role of ideology and competing
nationalist groups, but he de-emphasizes the special role played by regional and national
elites. Although I am sympathetic to his efforts to locate more political accountability at the
level of the masses, I understand Banac to neglect those forces which have manipulated the
masses on the basis of phenomena such as nationalism/nationality. In one sense, he
convolutes the process by which ethnic and identity-based conflicts develop. Far too rigid
an element of causality is injected, producing a model such as the following: the presence of
different identity groups in a specific area yields political incompatibility, which yields
conflict, which yields efforts by elites to cope with such conflict (Banac, 1984: 12).
By focusing upon a brief but important period of history in Yugoslavia (1918-1921),
Banac’s effort could be deemed an attempt to piece together or reconstruct the origins of
nationalist tendencies in the present (Banac, 1984: 12). Nevertheless, two problems arise
with this attempt. First, Banac toys with the idea of locating present-day feuds in a complex
historical record (though not an ancient one). Moreover, he introduces a heavily linear
component to understanding how identity-based tensions have arisen more recently.
Certainly, it would be implausible to assume blindly that Balkan conflict within recent years
stems from a clean progression of events set into motion in 1918. Historieal regression and
progression do occur, contributing to the means by which identity-based conflict is
fabricated. Finally, Banae removes much political accountability from the “special interests”
(Banac, 1984: 29) of elites seeking to assert their position at the national or sub-national
level. For the sake of keeping my argument consistent, I maintain that in order to secure
their position elites do in fact require the attention of the masses. However, this “need”
often represents the need to manipulate them in order to promote perverse interests.
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Essential 1\’, what authors such as Banac and Larrabec are doing is providing a more
descriptive account of ethnic conflict in the Balkans. Yet, their intentions include
explanation as well. In their efforts to achieve this they inadvertently have favored the
element of description. How is this so? Explanation usually entails some means of
accounting for phenomena or try ing to justify how/why it has or does occur. It is here where
a number of authors has demonstrated deficiency in accounting for the “how” aspect of
analyzing phenomena. Both Banac and Larrabee, for example, cite nationalist and ethnic
conflict as forces driving other events such as war or choices by national leaders to execute
bellicose policies. But they do not succeed in explaining how national elites manipulate
phenomena such as ethnic conflict. Therefore, listing off events such as ethnic conflict or
nationalism describes the byproducts of political activity but does not account for the process
by which events are influenced. To put this another way, it is inadequate to claim that ethnic
conflict and nationalism drive Balkan instability, because in actuality they are phenomena
resulting from leaders whose decisions stand to generate instability.
With this in mind, a good starting point might consist of asking how the existence
and eventual fall of the communist order contributed to recent tensions in the Balkans. A
useful reference is that provided by Crawford and Lipschutz, who argue that “exclusive and
oppositional identities are politically constructed during periods of upheaval by eertain
members of political and economic elites” (Crawford and Lipschutz, 1997: 168). In the
context of the former Yugoslavia, ethnic and identity-based conflicts are not necessarily the
result of different ethnic groups consciously choosing to live in separate territorial spaces.
After the Second World War, for example. Marshal Tito established a number of provinces
based upon different ethnic groups. This maneuver, however, was to a large extent a
political choice made in order to augment support for his political party. Any of the new
provinces delegating allegiance to Tito would in turn receive greater financial assistance. As
time progressed throughout the Cold War, income disparities w ithin the provinces
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influenced the onset of inter-ethnic competition for the sake of scarce resources (1997; 1 70-
171). Hence, Tito and his regime fabricated a political tool out of ethnicity and identity.
By establishing different etlinic territories in Yugoslavia Tito did not act upon a
natural inclination toward what was necessarily most practical. Rather, his actions reveal the
creation of different provinces on the basis of ethnicity to be more of an arbitrary decision.
By arbitraiy it is meant that Tito could have relied upon other characteristics or elements
to construct his provinces. Neither ethnicity nor political identity necessarily are the most
appropriate means of revising political territories. Furthermore, until the latter portion of the
Cold War Yugoslavia did not suffer from the same degree of ethnic conflict now taking
place in the Balkans (Crawford and Lipschutz, 1997: 170). Once again, although the
communist order seemingly prov ided for general stability amongst members of different
ethnic groups, it can be seen how decisions made in its time also have contributed to present-
day conflicts. Still, the understanding of how ethnic conflict and nationalist drives have
been fueled in the Balkans is incomplete. Thus far 1 have attempted to demonstrate how
current ethnic conflicts do not necessarih' follow a perfect linear progression of historical
hatreds and disputes. But it is also necessary to examine how contemporary regional
political elites have contributed to ethnic disputes currently plaguing the Balkans.
One argument maintains that, in light of the end of the Cold War, political elites
such as those of Serbia (i.e. Milosevic and his ruling faction) have initiated conflicts with the
“other” in order to advance their political position and the resources of their respective
provinces. As institutional strength in states such as Serbia has diminished, political leaders
have sought to bolster their power and treat their economic hardships by seeking access to
much-needed resources. This has revealed itself in practices such as ethnic cleansing
—
especially given the resource-rich regions of Yugoslavia such as those in northern Kosovo.
Because of the means by which Serb provinces have been constaicted, over-ambitious
leaders such as Milosevic have used the concept of identity to mobilize their citizens against
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those who are unlike them, such as etlmic Albanian Muslims (Crawford and Lipschutz,
1997: 176).
Hence, in the case of the Balkans it can be seen that ethnic conflict does not become
ethnic conflict until regional elites decide for it to become prevalent. Consider, for example,
professionals in Bosnia who at the start of the Bosnian war earlier this decade pleaded with
Western scholars for them not to characterize the conflict as a purely ethnic one. Many
made reference to mutual, inter-ethnic coalitions which were at war with “ ‘those outsiders,
those thugs in the hills’ ” (Woodward in Drobizheva, 1996: 17). In this mamier it can be
seen that even when elites decide how to define the nature of a certain conflict, it is not to be
assumed that such a definition will be universally accepted. This is why it is important to
acknow ledge the various bodies of individuals involved in a particular conflict. There is of
course, the political regime and its leaders. Then there are the militar> forces. But there also
is a society comprised of professionals, w orkers, etc. who do not equally accept the basis
upon which engagement in a conflict is justified. Unfortunately, those who are most
impressionable and least inclined to challenge their elite leaders will be, often times, more
susceptible to accepting the justification behind a certain conflict. And yet in many cases
even the most easily influenced groups such as peasants forced to remain loyal to their elites
are capable of recognizing the contradictions in policy choices w hen identit\ -based conflicts
are used to justify war. During the bombing of Serbia in 1999, a report was publicized in
w hich members of a Serb family stated that they w ould have to adopt a militant spirit toward
Kosovar Albanians living along their border—the same Kosovars with whom they once
lived, worked and shared similar social interests {CNN/Headlwe News 25 April 1999). My
point here is that adopting a certain attitude seems more to be a function of the fears instilled
by political leaders such as Milosevic. In other words, it is difficult to defy the stances of
one's political leaders, especially in times of conflict which are not even completely
understood by all.
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Even in the absence of immediate conflict, political elites such as Milosevic and the
members of his ruling party are capable of stirring up popular sentiments against members
whose identity they designate to be different. Just prior to the fall of communism, evidence
supports the notion that Milosevic himself made efforts to ftirther estrange his ‘people” from
Albanian Muslims. This was done by his exaggeration of the differences between those
adliering to the Muslim and Christian faiths. In this manner, he was capable of embellishing
the Serb Orthodox Church for the purpose of energizing Serb nationalism (Crawford and
Lipschutz, 1997. 177). For Milosevic, this allowed him to legitimize his later convictions
against members of different ethnic groups, as has been revealed most recently in Kosovo.
But taken by itself, religious difference is rarely a necessaix' or sufficient condition for the
onset of regional hostilities. Some force usually is responsible for mobilizing the masses
through the use of a political instalment, such as religion.
Interestingly, Susan L. Woodward asks why post-communist states tend to have their
conflicts framed in terms of ethnicity and nationalism, as opposed to economic perils
(Woodward in Drobizheva. 1996: 28). As I would argue, one response is that ethnicih’ and
nationalism appear to be more salient because ever\ one is at some level compelled to
accept/reject or search for a particular identity. This encourages political elites to rely upon
ethnicitN' and nationalism because the\’ seem to elicit more passionate responses from the
masses. Obviously, relying upon economic strife is a great mobilizing mechanism. But
since most of the post-communist states suffer from economic woes, it does not allow
regional elites to find a means of distinguishing their problems from the problems of other
states. In other words, it becomes difficult for elites to justify why their nation deserv es
access to particular resources if the bordering nation is Just as needy. Therefore, identity
politics becomes a vibrant means of rallying public support despite its superficiality and the
many falsities behind contemporaiy depictions of identity.
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In the matter of the Balkans I have tried to argue that present-day ethnic and nationalist-
based conflicts do not necessarily represent the product of hundreds of years of relentless
disputes among different groups. Although we must be sensitive to mutual cultural
differences, it is difficult to accept that the unending belligerence in the Balkans of this
decade has been a function of ethnic hatreds originating during the Medieval Serb Empire or
during the Ottoman Empire. Rather, the communist and post-communist world have
provided the conditions upon which elites have abused their positions in order to secure
political authority while pursuing resources and national survival. Thus far I have argued
from a standpoint that tends to confine the influences of identity and nationalist-based
conflicts to the actions of elites in areas in which these conflicts have occurred. But are
there other influences acting upon the surge in ethnic conflicts and nationalistic calls? The
following section attempts to explain how the internotional community also has contributed
to a less-than-critical understanding of the nature of identity politics and nationalism.
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CHAPTER 9
INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES
The Western world has been ainthing but sensitive to the particularities of ethnic
conflict and calls for nationalism in the post-communist world. Policymakers and diplomats
of the United States and Western Europe especially, have contributed to the presentation of
the idea that ethnic conflict is extremely rigid and difficult to assess, much less treat. When
this occurs, a false consensus among policymakers is established, thereby preventing a more
critical understanding of identity politics and nationalism from emerging. Consider the
following statement, for example;
Warren Cliristophcr, whose expert status derived from his position
as Secretajy of State, amiounced on \ht MocNeil-Lehrer Newshour
that Washington could do nothing because all groups in Yugoslavia
were consumed by “ancient hatreds” (Sadkovich, 1998: 19).
Such statements are not uncommon and arc not limited to state-level representatives. During
the 1999 bombing of Serbia 1 can recall numerous U S. Senators who in television/radio
interviews presented their understanding of Balkan conflict as one reaching far back into
world history. This is dangerous, namely because it influences the construction of a narrow
foreign policy which neglects to address the more crucial factors underpinning conflicts such
as those based on identity. Ultimately, the U.S./NATO response to events in Serbia
consisted of a relentless bombing campaign, supposedly to defend the victims of ethnic
cleansing. Yet, as anyone who even modestly continues to follow events in the region
realizes, mutual hostilities and mutual distrust have remained, if not increased. This only
reinforces the misguided belief that identity-based conflicts are tremendously difficult to
treat and therefore usually must lead to physical conflicts.
Moreover, by responding to ethnic conflicts (such as those in the Balkans) with
militaristic choices, states such as the U.S. and regional bodies such as NATO leave little
room for diplomacy. Some scholars have even held the belief that the Western world has
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been too slow to produce a more definitive end, militarily, to ethnic conflicts in the post-
communist world (Dawisha and Parrot, 1997: 8-9). Tliis is especially contradictor)
,
given
the plurality of policymakers who do not even accept that such conflicts can be ended in a
conclusive manner. At the same time, 1 am not denying the severity of atrocities committed
111 regions such as the Balkans with respect to ethnic conflict. However, I am suggesting that
the Western world has failed to address conflicts in the post-communist states in such a way
that outright violence and conflict will be discouraged. For example, by observing
Western/NATO militarv- intervention members of the Balkans might be more inclined to
believe that physical force still remains a practical means of treating disagreements: If the
West can be militaristic, then should not the Balkans engage in physical conflict as well?
The Western world, in my assessment, has >et to serve as an enviable international role
model. As mentioned earlier, identities are capable of change; this includes the notion of
victim/oppressor. For example, at present both ethnic Albanians and Serbs have been
victims and oppressors in the aftermath of the NATO bombing campaign of 1999.
It also is ironic that NATO, instituted to serve as a Cold War deterrent, engaged in
its most elaborate, expensive campaign not during the Cold War but during the Kosovo
conflict. What does this reveal about Western intentions? On one level it demonstrates that
the West will continue to present ethnic conflict in post-communist states as deeply-rooted
and difficult to treat, for the sake of its own political purposes. Since the end of the Cold
War the U S. in particular has been searching for a new means by which to define the
“enemy” in international politics. Or at the least, it has been searching for a new rival.
Despite the absence of the Soviet Union it is entirely possible that the U.S. will use regional
conflicts such as those in the Balkans in order to define its international objectives and
purposes. This would allow it to justify a broad range of international militarv’ activity. But
this leaves little room for productive diplomacy in treating the underlying factors of ethnic
mobilization and calls for nationalism in the post-communist world.
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Equally problematic is the Western attempt to impose its own brand of democracy
upon the post-communist states, many which have little or no experience with this
institution. Without question, this m and of itself also relates to political identity because
while sub-national groups are experiencing changes in how they perceive themselves, they
often are expected to acquire democratic characteristics (Dawisha, 1997: 4). This can be
pamftilly difficult given that they also must undergo processes of economic privatization and
the construction of new state administrative institutions. Hence, the order in which the West
has advocated the post-communist transition does not necessarily represent the most
practical means.
Nor have the Western media offered a ftmdamental evaluation of the nature of ethnic
conflict and nationalistic calls. We live in an age where the media—especially the television
media, possess an increasing monopoly on what is defined as critical news (Dawisha, 1997:
1 j 7). Wlien conflicts in the abroad occur, audiences tend to perceive those receiving most
attention as the only or central conflicts occurring in the world at a given time. Tliis
escalates our understanding of how severe such conflicts are, thus allow ing us to cast doubt
upon the degree to which they can be remedied. Moreover, when particular conflicts such as
those in Bosnia or Kosovo occur audiences are deprived of news equalK' if not more severe
with respect to events in other regions. As Quester w arns, “the commitment of the American
public to the components of the former Soviet Union will be shockingly uneven” (Quester,
quoted in Dawisha, 1997: 137).
A further problem with respect to the international influence upon the politics of
identity in post-communist states relates to NATO intentions. Since 1994 the U S. and
Western Europe actively have sought to increase NATO membership by including states
formerl)' of the Warsaw Pact. Although NATO has yet to subsume all of the states w hich it
deems fit to be members, its intentions have had a profoundly negative impact upon
reactions in post-communist states, namely Russia (See Dawisha, 1997: 68-100). NATO’s
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plans, though, for increasing its membership also have had an mimical effect upon those
states which it does not yet consider fit for membership. In other words, by refusing to
invite certain states to join it reinforces the notion that there is a aindamental identity-based
difference between NATO and non-NATO states. Furthermore, the desire to expand NATO
still serves as somewhat of a contradiction: the purpose for which it initially was designed is
no longer relevant, yet the world is expected to believe that there are other states or regions
creating an equally volatile security threat as the USSR was thought to pose (1997: 69). In
some ways this is just what the West has done by relying upon a NATO alliance to engage in
recent ethnic conflicts in the Balkans—that is, it has created a new adversarv'.
In matters of identity-based conflicts the West has been particularly insensitive
toward Russian perspectives. During the Kosovo crisis Russia expressed its disapproval
concerning the bombing of the former Yugoslavia. Although the West and NATO have
sought to establish a better relationship since the end of the Cold War, the West clearly
ignored Russian pleas during the conflict in Kosovo. Instead, it leaned toward acceptance of
the belief that the Russian government was quite sympathetic to the Milosevic regime.
However, this is not entirely accurate. During the spring of 1999 scholarship from the
Center for Democracy in DC revealed that Russians were more attached to the prospects for
safety with respect to Serbian citizens—not necessarily Milosevic.^ By refusing to give
serious attention to the Russian position during the Kosovo conflict, the West contributed
heavily to its ow n role as a determinant in how' ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia
w ould be perceived—that is, less as a product of elite ambitions and more as a product of
natural hatreds.
A more recent Western construct has been that of the “rogue” state. This concept is
especialK’ baffling, yet members of the First World such as the United States and Great
^
1 first became aware of this through an interview with an unnamed senior policy analyst at the Center for
Democracy, on CNN/Headline News 5 Ma\' 1999.
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Britain use it freeK' as if they have an airtight grasp upon its meaning. Diplomats and heads
of state tend to use the term “rogue state” to refer to a specific nation not of the First World,
which they perceive to have the tremendous potential for instigating serious international
security conflicts. Often times these states’ regimes and their activities tend to be virtually
boycotted by powers such as the U.S. The term rogue state, however, only recently has been
used in its present context. In fact, it has been reshaped over the past twenty years and has
acquired its new meaning in the post-Cold War era. A handfol of U.S. Secretaries of State
has contributed to the contemporary usage of “rogue” state. All of them have presumed that
such states have tremendously “irrational” (Mufson 2000: Al) policy intentions, to the point
where they would risk self-destruction in order to defy the First World.'® Yet, in a concise
piece for the Washington Post, Mufson suggests that rogue states actually are concerned
with self-perpetuation. Furthermore, various scholars have posited that the concept of the
rogue state has acted as a post-Cold War device used to justify defense system proposals, as
well as a general need to define the present-day enemy (2000: Al). Examples of rogue
states include Iran, Iraq and North Korea.
Although the former Yugoslavia does not seem to meet the direct criteria of being a
rogue state (such as the capability to produce nuclear warheads/technology), my point is that
members of the international community (namely in the West) have appointed categories for
states which possess characteristics diametrically opposite to their own. Obviously, this
does not excuse the threat of nuclear war. However, it implies that members of the Western
world have labeled national communities on the basis of the actions of their leaders, w ho do
not necessarily represent the interests of the masses. Should Serbia qualify as a rogue state
because of the actions of the Milosevic regime? This calls into question the rigidih’ and
structure of w hat is deemed a nation-state. Do all of the members of the nation and the state
'® Note the U.S. preoccupation with the concept of rationality/irrationality—a fundamental concept to
traditional theoretical approaches such as ncorealism.
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become rogues because of the decisions of their mling administration‘s How well does the
stigma of “rogue state” represent the collectivities of people comprising a nation-state's Just
consider the stereot>pical representations of people from different ethnic backgrounds whose
states of origin have been labeled “terrorist” states.
Concepts such as the rogue state act as a means by which members of the
international community construct the international identit>’ of other states. Taken by
themselves, without a point of reference, no state is of the First World, the Third World or
even a rogue state. But when powers such as those of the West decide to appoint labels to
other states, they contribute to the subordination/marginalization of those states. Practically
speaking, it still is dangerous to label the former Yugoslavia a land of renegade factions as
this only complicates any prospects for addressing security issues m the region with a critical
eye toward achieving and maintaining an eventual peace. Mufson asks, for e.xample, why
the U.S. does not maintain a uniform policy approach to states which they “could just as
easily call... rogue states” (2000; Al), such as India. One valid response lies in the notion
that the First World consciously and unconsciously chooses how to define other states.
Scholars and policymakers also must reflect upon the nature of Western intentions with
respect to involvement in recent Balkan conflicts. Has Westeni/NATO “peacekeeping” been
exclusively about preserving lives in the Balkans, or has it also represented a desire for
regions such as Europe to bolster and defend the ideals they supposedly represent? As
Ignatieff points out, an array of European scholars was reluctant to scrutinize the potential
for Balkan conflict prior to the Bosnian war. Yet the onset of hostilities has prompted many
of them to assess the region very closely in an effort to reinvigorate “European” values such
as sympathy/concern for the other (Ignatieff in Danchev and Halverson, 1996: xi).
Ignatieff also is quick to illustrate the nature of Western intervention in recent Balkan
conflicts. In one sense our efforts to treat unstable situations in regions such as the former
Yugoslavia have worked to prolong more peacefi.il resolutions. For example, during the
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Bosnian war a number of food supplies intended for refugees accidentally became directed
toward militants partaking in the repression of Bosnian Muslims. Ignatieff suggests that the
Western world has been willing to provide a minimum, basic line of defense for potential
victims of practices such as genocide. At the same time, however, it has been reluctant to
directly confront those leaders (e g. Milosevic) who have been greatly responsible for such
practices (Ignatieff in Danchev and Halverson, 1996; xiv). Has Westem/NATO involvement
in Balkan conflict actually represented a form of “narcissism” (1996: xi)?
But NATO is not the only Western institution/regime to have contributed to
prolonging Balkan conflict. Take, as another example, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Its action (or inaction) has been illustrative of
counterproductive decisions with respect to regional conflicts. By exploring the “Ten
Principles Guiding Relations Among States” (CSCE, 1997; 9) for the OSCE, it can be seen
that such a framework is narrow enough to prevent compliance among human rights
violators from being enforced. The first six principles essentially call for protection of state
sovereignty and territorial integrity, continued non-intervention, peaceful conflict resolution
and restraint from the use of force against other states (1997; 9). Hence, it is expected that
the organizational and institutional structures of the OSCE—including tribunals, arbiters and
shaming mechanisms" will assist in yielding compliance with human rights treaties and
statements such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
This however does not work well in practice. Although treaties in theory represent
contractual obligations between states in which it is agreed upon that some infringement of
sovereignty will occur (Donnelly, 1998; 27), the case of the former Yugoslavia reveals itself
as lacking the treaties which could have prevented more recent atrocities. With respect to
other institutional mechanisms such as tribunals, it is apparent that legal ailings can be
" Shaming mechanisms include for example the publishing of reports that cite violations and
noncompliance within a given state.
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rendered but certainly not enforced when states such as Serbia cling to the principle of
sovereignt>' (CSCE, 1996: 16). Hence, much like decisions taken by the various structures
of the United Nations, judgements made by the OSCE can serv e as recommendations but
cannot necessarily be enforced without some form of sanctions or external involvement
within states committing the greatest human rights abuses.
The point here is that when political stakes are high enough states do infringe upon the
sovereignty of other states or at least pressure them to allow their sovereignty to be
compromised. However, the West tends to perceive the issue of human rights enforcement
as one not requiring the same attention that other issues demand, such as security, economics
or even the environment. Hence sovereignty, as protected by the compact of the OSCE,
rarely encounters interference generated by human rights issues.
Within the five years prior to the onset of the Bosnian war U S. participation in the OSCE
gav'c tremendous attention to Russians communism began to whither. Yearlv reports of
U.S. activity during this time suggest that the former Yugoslavia was not taken seriously as
an area of potential instability (CSCE, 1988: 1 1-16). The OSCE demonstrated an awareness
of the need to encourage economic development in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, but
trade policy concerns ultimately were directed toward relations w ith the soon to be deflmct
Soviet Union. With respect to human rights awareness, greater concentration was placed
upon the issue of forced labor in the Soviet Union (1988: 16), but the OSCE generally
overlooked the precursors to abuses in the former Yugoslavia.
Analyzing the Kosovo conflict challenges some of the traditional assumptions about
the nature of human rights protection relative to the international community, as discussed
earlier. Though it is assumed that human rights violations are practices occurring within the
boundaries of sovereign nations directed by repressive internal regimes, the recent conflict
adds a new dimension: what happens when international actors contribute to a regime’s
decision to enact human rights violations?
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Prior to the onset of the 1999 air strikes U S. Secretar>- of State Albright participated
in an effort to impose a directive upon the Milosevic regime. This directive gave preference
to the rebel group, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which previously was considered to
have been an impediment to any peaceful settlement between Milosevic and Kosovo
President Rugova. Moreover, the U.S. brand of diplomacy demanded that a peace settlement
would have to include NATO ground forces with the goal of attaining statehood for Kosovo
within the next few years (Kuperman, 1999: A20). Obviously this strategy was unsuccessful
and if anything, it might have helped to augment the intensity of the Kosovo crisis.
It is by no means my intention to exonerate Milosevic or his regime. To the contrary
he has been an obstacle to peace and an impediment to the cause of human rights.
Nonetheless, the U.S. played a significant role in fueling Milosevic’s decision to employ
ethnic cleansing within Kosovo. Had the U.S. forsaken the ultimatum made to the Serbs, it
is entirely possible that even Milosevic would have decided not to rely upon ethnic cleansing
given that no massive atrocities had been undertaken against the Kosovars since he came to
power in the late 1980's (Kuperman, 1999: A20).
Wliat I am suggesting here is that the Western world and its institutions/regimes
such as the OSCE have been guilty in part for fabricating the circumstances under which
human rights abuses could occur. For those who still are unconvinced that it is feasible to
infringe upon sovereignty in order to enforce human rights, it should be noted that an irony
exists in that principles such as those of the OSCE, which have endorsed diplomacy, have
been ignored by the NATO alliance. Yet this type of infringement has had
counterproductive results to date.
In tying the Kosovo crisis to the matter of human rights it can be seen that atrocities
yvithin the territorial space of one state can elicit attention and action from other states. Our
sense of “duty” in terms of this conflict stems from the U.S.AVest’s refusal to assess
critically the circumstances in the former Yugoslavia. In turn, this refusal has alloyved for
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human rights violations to occur. Hence, the Western world has helped make the human
rights aspect of the Kosovo conflict a concern. Consequently, some even argue that we
(meaning the U.S.) have thus imposed upon ourselves the obligation to contribute
economically to those etlmic Albanians who have been displaced by the Serb militarv
(Kuperman, 1999: A20).
With respect to the dissolution of Yugoslavia at the beginning of this decade the
malleable nature of sovereignty is readily apparent. The creation of independent states such
as Serbia as well as the creation of autonomous provinces tied to such states (e.g. Kosovo)
demonstrates how sovereignty was fabricated. Put another way, it was by virtue of political
and economic elites that the new sovereign entities of the former Yugoslavia were designed.
Sovereignty relied upon the performative acts of such elites. This resulted in ‘a bewildering
alteration of political boundaries” (Fors\the, 1994; 1 19), clearly exemplifying how
sovereign polities are constructed.
Wliat I am suggesting here is that just as vigorously as elites defined the new
sovereign states of the Balkans, international bodies such as the United Nations and the
OSCE could have intervened within such states in order to ensure greater human rights
protection. The OSCE, for example, pledges not to breach the sovereignty of other nations.
But at the time of the formation of the new Yugoslav states sovereignty temporarily had lost
its determinacy. This is when international action to prevent instability could have been
employed in order to enforce human rights compliance.
Wliere the OSCE is concerned, it could have played a significant role in tiy ing to
better guarantee human rights protection. One such means could have included a
recommendation by the OSCE to the West to insist that “legal recognition” (ForsUhe, 1994:
120) of Yugoslav states be made contingent upon human rights compliance. The same could
have applied to the issue of delegating foreign economic assistance to such states, although
sanctions are by no means the most efficacious means of conducting international affairs.
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Nevertheless, the West was noi paralyzed in its position relatu e to the formation of
sovereign states within the former Yugoslavia. This is especially so in light of the incentive
to acquire membership within the European Union. If states such as Serbia wish to become
privileged members of the EU they could be prompted to comply with human rights accords
and agreements.
If sovereignty largely is a function of mutual recognition between states as
Biersteker and Weber argue (Biersteker and Weber, 1996: 2-3), then it can be seen that the
West was not powerless with respect to the rise of oppressive state regimes such as that of
Milosevic. Granted, this model does not apply to all scenarios. It would be difficult to
assert that the international community could adopt the same attitude toward China in light
of its human rights violations. However, the difference between China and the recently
(re)formed states of the Balkans rests upon the realization that the West could have
prevented states such as Serbia from becoming repressive giv'cn Serbia's need for sovereign
recognition after the breakup of Yugoslavia. More broadly, the issue of sovereignty and its
potential infringement with respect to human rights abuses suggests that a little infringement
now can prevent the need for greater infringement later.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In light of the means by which identity-based conflict and calls for nationalism have been
constructed throughout various regions of the post-communist world, what prospects remain
for peace? One response is that the entire notion of “transition” from the Cold War era begs
further analysis (Bova, 1991: 1 13). In this regard, one might address the post-communist
transition by asking, “transition to what”? Although the centrality of having democratic
institutions has arisen throughout the former communist order, not all such institutions have
been successful. Hence, by assuming that “transition” necessanly implies democratic
transition we are entering uncertain territory. Scholars and policymakers need to be more
careful in generating expectations about the nature of the transition. With weak infomial and
civil associations and institutions (Di Palma, 1991: 49), regional elites continue to usurp
power and exercise their desire to maintain authority. As it stands, political and economic
elites have retained far too much of this capacity.
A stronger civil society might serve as a better mechanism for developing a national
outlook which takes into account a greater spectrum of the citizenrv' without politicizing
identity, although this is far from a cure-all. Buttressing civil society would entail
assurances that key elements such as free speech would not be hindered (Frentzel-Zagorska,
1990: 759) or that citizens would seek to become eligible for voting. Indeed, there have
been stronger prospects for informal associations among citizens of the post-communist
order. Even prior to the fall of the Soviet Union evidence indicates a dramatic increase in
unofficial associations within Russia, many which sought to become legitimate before the
eyes of the Soviet government. In turn, these relationships tended to provide communist
elites with a sense of unsteadiness (Brovkin, 1990: 233). This indicates the need for a
strengthening of such associations throughout the post-communist world so as to pose a
challenge to current political and economic elites. However, the role of civil society is not to
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be overemphasized. It too can be heavily problematic for the development of nation-states
given that the entire concept of civil-society encompasses not only peaceflil and progressive,
but also dangerous and oppressive groups such as mobs.
This section has been designated “Concluding Remarks” but not “Conclusion” so as
not to imply that I have chosen a rigid, definitive or narrow set of corollaries with respect to
the nature of identity-based politics and nationalism in the post-Cold War world. To the
contrar>', scholarly and practical analyses of this topic are by no means complete. The nature
of identity-based politics is not static. A more critical understanding of topics such as
identity and nationalism entails not only intense research but the willingness of scholars and
practitioners to welcome the more robust alternatives to the traditional approaches driving
international relations (and International Relations).
Where then, does contemporar> scholarly and practical attention to identity-based
conflict leave us? Consider the opening passage of this paper, on the theoretical side, from
Lake and Rothchild:
The most widely discussed e.xplanations of ethnic conflict are, at best...
wrong. Etlmic conflict is not caused directly by inter-group differences,
“ancient hatreds” and centuries-old feuds... Nor were etlmic passions, long
bottled up by repressix e commmiist regimes, simply uncorked by the end
of the Cold War. (Lake and Rothchild, 1996)
At first glance this statement would appear to fall w ell within the parameters of a more
critical outlook upon identitx-based conflict. However, Lake and Rothchild’s analysis still
reflects a general trend w hich seeks to assume a tremendous amount of predictive power for
future outcomes in international affairs. Although they are careful not to accept the ancient
hatreds argument, the authors adntittedly employ a rational-choice approach to assessing
identity-based, or more specifically, ethnic conflict (1996: 42), This approach stems from
their assumption that ethnic groups w ill react to the uncertainty of the future (in the context
of the post-Cold War). And although the authors acknow ledge the role of elite-based
manipulation, ultimately they introduce a linear model of historical progression in w hich
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actors behave in one manner as a result of their pure self-interest. Furthermore, Lake and
Rothchild attribute accountability to elites with respect to the managemeni of ethnic conflict
as well (1996: 42). This leaves us with a vague sense of which elites are responsible for
inducing conflict and those which are responsible for trving to quell it. Are they responsible
for both?
In short. Lake and Rothchild make a strong contribution to the literature on identity-based
conflict but they do not completely break free of the rational-choice hold. By grounding
their efforts in an attempt to seek out the origins of ethnic conflict they exliibit a preference
to overemphasize the search for beginnings. Such an attempt neglects the importance of a
more genealogical approach to identity-based conflict. Moreover, scholars and practitioners
of international affairs must wonder what happens w hen a rational-choice paradigm such as
that of Lake and Rothchild does not apply to situations in w hich the authors contend that it
w ould. By no means have all states of the post-communist w orld suffered from undying
ethnic/identity-based conflict. As I mentioned at the beginning of this writing, the creation
of a large-scale paradigm which universalizes the origins of identity-based conflict is not my
intention. Such an effort would be futile.
On the practical side, media-oriented accounts of recent identity-based conflicts such as
those in the Balkans continue to emphasize w ith vigor the role of complex, lengthy histories.
Even in the midst of the Kosovo conflict of 1999, efforts were made by the print media to
describe the historical complexities troubling Serbs and Albanians w ith regard to territorial
claims over areas within the former Yugoslavia. One such account brings the reader back to
the Twelfth Century in order to trace the origins of present-day ethnic conflict (Perlez,
1999), Granted, the manipulative strength of leaders such as Milosevic is acknow ledged, but
media representations such as this continue to suggest that populations neatly maintain an
awareness of their nation’s past such that this knowledge impels them to support
nationalistic policies. Veiy rarely does the media attempt to reverse this conception and
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posit that manipulative elites draw upon the subjectivih of historv' in order to pursue
survival or their own objectives. Rather, they inject a strong pessimistic outlook upon
regional affairs and insist that nothing but “resentment and hostility” (Kinzer, 1992)
consume areas suffering from identity-based conflicts. From a more critical perspective,
other media representations have given credence to the notion that present-day identity-
based conflict and nationalism in the Balkans are the result of contemporary political
ambitions (Kaufman, 1992). Still others have professed the belief that the U.S./NATO
coalition has been far too impatient in pursuing a peaceful outcome in the Balkans—one not
obsessed with racial divisions (Rosenfeld, 2000: A35). Again, it is not my intention to deny
the importance of historv' or to eliminate its validity. However, it also is crucial to scaitinize
how historv’ has been re-presented to the masses.
With respect to foreign policymakers and diplomats, a more critical understanding of
identity-based conflict continues to be ignored. At the international level, the Western
world, including its NATO forces, has transfomied the Kosovo conflict into a dispute over
how best to manage its aftermath, and whom should be responsible for such management.
Put another way, the “NATO allies are fighting among themselves over how to keep a
deteriorating situation in the Serbian prov ince from spinning out of their control” (Perlez,
2000). Balkan instability, then, has become highly politicized to the point where the U S.
and other leading states of the West have been consumed by protecting their own interests.
More particularly, the U.S. has sought to diminish the publicity of failed militarv’ efforts in
the Balkans so as to evade negative exposure in upcoming national elections (2000).
Meanwhile, unrest between Serbs and Kosovars continues but Western politics assert
themselves over the security of an otherwise insecure region.
Returning to the case of the Baltics, similar portrayals of the volatilitv' of ethnic conflict
have per\ aded media analyses. Such representations warn of the brewing conflicts between
ethnic Russians living in the abroad. Interestingly, a Russia Today article uses the term
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‘powder keg” (Pounsett, 1998) to describe the nature of this situation—the same term
employed by Larrabee in his edited volume to which I made reference earlier. At the same
time, however, articles such as this also have been willing to concede that the concept of
identity throughout the former Soviet states now is a sensitive topic because of the means by
which identity was assigned to citizens during the Soviet era (1998). In other words, there
ore indications that media analysts are aware of the highly constructed nature of identity in
the post-communist world.
One of the driving claims behind this w riting has been that theor>’ and practice are not
unrelated. Nor should ihty be estranged from one another. This paper largely has been
about the Balkans and the Baltics, but it also is intended to be an exercise in better
understanding the relationship between theoretical approaches in IR and practical
applications in ir. There is a strong prevalence of w hat I have referred to as the “traditional”
theoretical approaches in present-day policymaking within and between nation-states. Such
a connection between these two entities obligates us to acknow ledge that theoiy and practice
are not disconnected from each other. With this in mind, however, scholars and practitioners
of international affairs have little reason to rest and remain content with the dominant
approaches of conducting relations betw een states. It is for this reason that the value of
critical studies and appraisals of international affairs is just beginning to gain recognition.
International relations and international relations have not e.xhausted themselves of fresh
perspectives. How^ much progress they can achieve will depend upon the willingness of
scholars and practitioners to open up a dialogue with challenging approaches.
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